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more private sector involvement in infrastructure procurement.
Since 1990s, this involvement has moved to an integrated model
of a Public Private Pratnerships (PPP) contract which bundles the
design, construction, financing and operation activities into a
single long-term contract.
Hodge et al (2010, p. 595) noted that the importance of the PPP
has increased worldwide. From Table 1, it can be seen that a
number of countries, such as Spain, Italy, the United States and
Canada increased their use of the PPP procurement route. Mean-
while, the UK, was the country with greatest PPP investment in
the mid-2000s (Yescombe, 2007, p. 30). Kappeler and Nemoz (2010,
p. 8) reported that the UK was, by 2009, the largest PPP country
with the investment portfolio, comprising 52.5% of the total PPP
investment in European countries.
Cuttaree and Mandri-Perrott (2011, p. 8) noted that global PPP
investment rose from 2005 to 2007. However, in 2008 there was a
slight decrease as an effect of the world financial crisis and a
greater decrease in 2009 as the crisis went on. In contrast, there is
a growing phenomenon since 2009 that middle income countries,
such as Brazil, India, Russia Turkey and South Africa, increased
their use of PPP which contributed to worldwide PPP investment
increases (p. 15). Hawkesworth (2011) stated that, based on an
OECD survey, the percentage of public sector infrastructure
investment through PPP varies among countries and can reach
more than 20%. Table 2 shows that two countries (Mexico and
Chile) are using PPP for more than 20% of public sector infra-
structure investment. They are followed by South Korea with a
percentage of between ten to 15 and another seven countries
including the UK with percentages of between five and ten
(Hawkesworth, 2011).
The development of the PPP market has been growing in
different stages. In Figure 1, Deloitte (2006) classified the world-
wide PPP market, based on its sophistication and activities.
Countries in stage one are those with the lowest level of market
maturity. They focus PPP activities on establishing policy, initiating
a central unit to guide implementation, developing deal structures
and public sector comparators, building the new marketplace, and
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ABSTRACT
For more than two decades, Public Private Partner-
ships (PPP) had developed worldwide as an instru-
ment to procure public infrastructure where govern-
ment funds are limited. This practice supports the
covergent theory of the public and private sector.
Indonesia experience with PPP follows most of what
had been done by countries overseas with some
deviations. The main reasons for going for PPP for
Indonesia government is to fill the gap in finance
and capability in procuring the infrastructure. Unof-
ficial reason such as for off-balance sheet and ideo-
logical is not relevant. Up to now, the Government
only allow investment in hard economic infrastruc-
ture.  Instead of using pure private finance, Indone-
sia Government facilitates public funds either from
Central Government or Local Governments to fi-
nance PPP projects. In most cases, this involvement
is because of marginality of the project. This results
in the condition where the Government still has
dominant role in the existing PPP projects. Com-
pared to the PPP framework in other countries like
in the UK, Indonesia PPP lacks of attention on out-
put specification and risk transfer. This may be be-
cause of lacking of experiences as well as due to
high degree of Government involvement. Rigorous
policy is needed in this area to ensure Government
to achieve better value for money.
Keywords: Public-Private Partnerships, Public Infra-
structure Procurement, International PPP, Indonesia
PPP, value for money mechanism
INTRODUCTION
Growing demand for public infrastructure
in the context of limited public funds has
pushed governments in many countries to see
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TABLE 1: INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMMES
Source: Dealogic in Yescombe (2007)
TABLE 2: PPPS’ PERCENTAGE IN PUBLIC SECTOR INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT
         Source: Hawkesworth (2011)
FIGURE1: PPP MARKET MATURITY CURVE
Source: Deloitte (2006, p. 6)
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applying early lessons from transport to other sectors.
Countries in stage two focus on developing new
hybrid delivery models, expanding the PPP marketplace,
leveraging new sources of funds from capital markets and
using PPP to drive service innovation. Countries with a
high level of maturity, such as the UK and Australia,
focus on refining new innovative models, developing
more flexible approaches to the roles of the public and
private sectors, providing more sophisticated risk models
and infrastructure, giving greater focus to the total
lifecycle of projects, and increasing the learning of the
public sector from private partners.
In Indonesia, the PPP is developed after
decentralisation reform in 2000s and starts to be used
intensively in the last few years. Based on Strategic Asia’s
(2012) assessment, in terms of market maturity, Indonesia
can be categorised under stage two where the Govern-
ment had undergone establishing policy, building new
market and developing non-transport PPP and now
focusing on PPP market expansion. This article aims at
analysing Indonesian’s experience with PPP as compared
with International development. The analysis focuses on
comparison on how International PPP especially and
Indonesia PPP is developed, reasons for the PPP and
mechanism in project assessment. This comparison is
useful to identify deviations and how they may affect PPP
development.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF PPP
DEVELOPMENT
The term ‘public sector’ is associated with governmen-
tal activity. This can be seen from the early studies of the
public and private sectors which refer to the comparison
between public agencies owned collectively by members
of political communities and the private firms owned by
entrepreneurs or shareholders (Boyne, 2002). In this area,
organisation theorists have come up with two different
accounts which some describe as different in nature but
others describe as convergent (Allison, 1979; Boyne,
2002; Hughes, 2003; Rainey et al, 1976).
From the literature it can be seen that there have
been some changes in the nature of the differences
between the public and private sectors. Higher degrees of
differences in the past have diminished. Rainey et al
(1976) argued that the government aspects are so wide,
varied and continually evolving that it is difficult to draw
a clear line. They further explained that there are two
interrelated phenomena that have made the public sector
more convergent on the private sector: first the intermin-
gling of governmental and non-governmental activities;
and, second, the increasing similarity of function, context
and role of the public sector with the private sector.
Rainey (2009) considered that there is little difference
between public and private organisations. He explained
that an organisation’s tasks and functions have more
influence on organisational characteristics than the
status of being public or private. This argument suggests
that, if the public sector has similar tasks and functions
to the private sector, they can be carried out by the
private sector.
One area, where public sector is largely similar with
private sector, is infrastructure procurement. Yescombe
(2007) said that public infrastructure can be classified
either by function or by form. In terms of function,
public infrastructure can be categorised into economic
infrastructure and social infrastructure. Economic
infrastructures are those which are expected to enhance
productivity and innovation (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004).
Economic infrastructure can be classified based on its
form into hard or soft economic infrastructure. Hard
economic infrastructure includes roads, highways,
bridges, ports, power and telecommunications: soft
economic infrastructure covers vocational training,
financial facilities for business transaction, research
activities, technology transfer and export assistance.
Social infrastructures are those which are needed for the
structure of society and relate to providing basic services
to households (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). They can be
classified further, based on their forms, into hard or soft
social infrastructure. Hard social infrastructure encom-
passes hospitals, schools, water supply, sewerage, housing,
prisons and care homes for the elderly: soft social
infrastructure include social security, community services
and environmental protection programmes.
The Public Private Partnerships (PPP) was introduced
in 1992 by the then UK Conservative Government under
the term Private Finance Initiative (PFI). Later, the
Labour Government introduced the term ‘Public Private
Partnerships’, referring to similar transactions. Treasury
(2000), in its document ‘Public Private Partnerships –
The Government’s Approach’ defined the PPP as:
the public sector contracts to purchase quality services, with
defined outputs, on a long-term basis from the private sector,
and including maintaining or constructing the necessary
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infrastructure. The term also covers financially free-standing
projects (e.g. the Second Severn Bridge) where the private
sector supplier designs, builds, finances and then operates an
asset and covers the costs entirely through direct charges on
the private users of the asset, with public sector involvement
limited to enabling the project to go ahead through assistance
with planning, licensing and other statutory procedure (p.
47).
This definition suggested that the PPP procurement
route is not aimed at buying an asset as what the govern-
ment does in conventional procurement but at buying
the required services for a lengthy period. In addition,
PPP is applicable for services which are paid for by either
the public authority or the end-users.
The UK then pionereed the development of PPP
around the world, but the PPP definition does not
necessarily refer to the idea of buying services as strictly
in the UK. The Canadian Council for PPP for instance
defined PPP as ‘a cooperative venture between the public
and private sectors, built on the expertise of each partner,
that best meets clearly defined public needs through the
appropriate allocation of resources, risks and rewards.’
Unlike the UK way which separate the role of public and
private sector, the Canadian PPP open the opportunity for
both the public sector in the activity of design, build,
finance and operate based the appropriate allocation of
resouces, risk and rewards (Siemiatycki, 2013).
The Ministry of Finance of Singapore (2004) defined
PPP as ‘long-term partnering relationships between the
public and private sector to deliver services. It is a new
approach that Government is adopting to increase
private sector involvement in the delivery of public
services.’ According to KPMG (2007), in Singapore, PPP
is seen as a way of bringing in specialist private sector
expertise to stimulate an exchange of ideas and bring
more international players into the domestic market
(KPMG 2007). Meanwhile, In India, the Department of
Economic Affairs of the Ministry of Finance (2005)
defines PPP as ‘a project based on contract or concession
agreement between a Government or statutory entity on
the one side and a private sector company on the other
side, for delivering an infrastructure service on payment
of user charges.’ This definition focuses on
Government’s concession to the private sector to develop
a project and provide services in return for payment of
user charges. The public sector’s engagement in the
Indian PPP is limited to the granting of the concession,
owing to financial constraints and lack of modern
technology.
In Indonesia, the initial regulation promoting the use
of PPP after the 1997 financial crisis was Presidential
Decree no 67/2005. This regulation suggested public
infrastructure to be procured through partnerships with
business entities such as private companies, state owned
enterprises (BUMN), Local Government Owned Enter-
prise (BUMND) and Cooperatives. In that regulation,
some characteristics of PPP are incorporated that the
purposes of the partnerships are: (1) to finance the
project through private sector involvement; (2) to im-
prove service’s quantity and quality through healthy
competition; (3) to improve the quality of project’s
management and maintenance; (4) to push the imple-
mentation of the principle of the users pay for the service
received. PPP definition is stated in Presidential Decree
(Perpres) no 13/2010 as ‘infrastructure procurement
through partnership agreement or concession granting
between ministry/Head of Government Body/Head of
Local Government with Business Entity.’ Again, this
definition is considered as a broad terms which does not
limit PPP to buying service as pioneered by the UK PPP.
The advantage of this broad definition is facilitating
government to have variations in project arrangements
based on available resources.
PPP DELIVERY METHODS
Grimsey and Lewis (2005, p. 346) stated that PPP
procurement is used to fill the gap between convention-
ally procured Government projects and full privatisation.
In addition, Ball and King (2006) differentiate PPP and
conventional procurement in three aspects. First, conven-
tional procurement only includes infrastructure procure-
ment in its contract. However, under the PPP, the
contract also includes private sector involvement in
financing and in post-construction activities, such as
infrastructure operation and maintenance. Second,
instead of specifying how the infrastructure should be
designed and procured, the PPP contract adheres to
output specification provided by the client who describes
the services that the public sector client needs. This
approach is expected to enable PPP bidders to come up
with the best design that the private sector can offer to
serve these needs at an affordable cost. Third, significant
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risks associated with the project should be transferred
from the public sector client to the private sector. Among
the three aspects, the OECD (2008, p. 18) considered risk
transfer to be the fundamental feature which differenti-
ates PPP from conventional procurement.
The difference between conventional and PPP
procurement can also be analysed from two dimensions
as suggested by Pietroforte and Miller (2002), namely
financing and delivery. The financing dimension can be
either direct or indirect. Direct finance is procurement
which is fully funded by the public sector, while indirect
finance is procurement fully funded by the private sector.
The project procurement dimension comprises either
segmented delivery or combined delivery. Segmented
delivery is a method of procurement where each activity
is undertaken under a separate contract. In contrast,
combined delivery is procurement whereby all activities
are undertaken under a single contract with the private
sector. The relation of the two dimensions is captured in
the four quadrants in Figure 2.
The four quadrants examine the combination of
project delivery and methods of financing. Quadrants 1
and 4 show the situation where the private sector has the
least role in financing activity. In these quadrants, the
private sector does not have any responsibility to provide
the needed funds. The difference between Quadrant 1
and Quadrant 4 is on the degree of procurement activi-
ties. Projects in Quadrant 4 undertake only one activity in
a single contract. Projects in Quadrant 1 are allowed to
undertake all the procurement activities in a single
contract. In Quadrant 2, the private sector has the
greatest role in both financing and infrastructure deliv-
ery. Procurement in Quadrant 2 shows that the private
sector has responsibility for providing funds and perform-
ing all procurement activities. The procurement method
in Quadrant 2 the subject of this thesis) represents the
characteristics of PPP, while Quadrants 1 and 4 represent
the conventional types of procurement. Quadrant 3 is
blank because no delivery method exists with the com-
bined charactistics of segmented delivery and indirect
finance.
Indonesia first experience with PPP type project is
Tangerang Merak Toll project in 1987. Prior to this
project, all toll roads were solely managed by PT Jasa
Marga as a state owned company. This early model is
more similar to joint venture where the government has
significant share in project company. It used modified
BOT model with a private company where the Govern-
ment also participated in financing the project (Pradono
et al, 2012). Table 3 shows toll road projects managed by
the private sector in Indonesia and how they are fi-
nanced. Among eight toll networks managed by the
private sector, six used modified BOT and only two purely
used BOT. The BOT model is relatively similar to the
origin PPP developed in the UK where the financing of
land acquisition, construction and operation and mainte-
nance is fully funded by the private sector. However,
through modified BOT, some parts of construction and
land acquisition are expected to be financed by the
government. Consequently, under this modified model,
the main PPP characteristics in terms of risk transfer will
not properly applicable.
FIGURE 2: CLASSIFICATION OF PROJECT DELIVERY METHODS
Source: adapted from Pietroforte and Miller (2002)
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REASONS FOR USING THE PPP
Based on the experience of other countries such as
the United Kingdom, there are a number of reasons
suggested for the extensive use of the PPP. These can be
categorised into official and unofficial reasons. The
official reasons are those stated by the government, while
the unofficial reasons are those interpreted by the public,
especially academics or public policy observers. The
following sub-sections discuss the two categories.
1. OFFICIAL REASONS
The PPP policy was adopted by the UK Conservative
Government in 1992 and continued by the Labour
Government from 1997 until 2010. In their official
statements, Governments of both persuasions have
stressed achieving greater investment and VFM for tax
payers as the main purposes for using the PPP.
I. GREATER INVESTMENT
Ford and Zussman (1997) said that in the 1980s,
governments considered two alternative mechanisms for
engaging the private sector: total privatisation of public
facilities and PPP. The privatisation enables governments
to transfer to the private sector the total responsibility for
developing, managing, and providing public services.
However, through PPP, governments are able to invite
private sector entities to finance and develop infrastruc-
ture projects without losing state control over the regula-
tory aspects of service provision, including the pricing of
the services provided by the infrastructure facility (Abdul-
Aziz 2007). In its development, PPP became the popular
option rather than privatisation which controversial
politically. Further, governments were hesitant to subject
certain facilities to total privatisation for reasons such as
national security.
In Treasury’s (2000) ‘Public Private Partnerships: The
Government Approach’ state that the suggested reforms
to the PPP policy were expected to result in significant
increases in the contribution made by private finance to
publicly-sponsored total gross investment, from 10% in
1998-99 to an average of 15% in 1999-2000 to 2001-02 (p.
13). This contribution was predicted to increase follow-
ing further reforms to the PPP to extend the scope of
public sector activities to which this procurement
method could be applied.
In its 2013 PPP book, Indonesian Ministry of Na-
tional Development Planning (MNDP) also used similar
argument on the need for PPP. It is said that by 2013,
Indonesia’s infrastructure investment to total output is at
around 3% which is below its pre-financial crisis level of
around 7% (MNDP, 2013, p. vi). The book quoted a UN
report that infrastructure investment is urgently required
because of rapid urbanization in Indonesia. Prior to this,
in a report published by OECD, it is said that public
spending on infrastructure in 2009 was only 1.9% of
GDP.
In May 2011, Indonesian Government launched a
development strategy called Master Plan for the Accelera-
tion and Expansion of Indonesia’s Economic Develop-
ment (MP3EI) published by the Coordinating Ministry of
Economic Affairs (CMEA) (2011). The then President
Yudhoyono said that this national strategy aims to
leapfrog Indonesia into the ten biggest economies by
2025. The strategy is expected to increase GDP to US
$4.5 trillion as well as by increasing GDP per capita
income from a current level of US$ 3000 to US$ 15,000.
The master plan suggests Indonesia development is based
TABLE 3: TOLL ROAD NETWORKS MANAGED BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Source: Indonesia Toll Road Authority, Ministry of Public Works (2008) and Pradono et al. (2012)
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on six economic regions or called ‘Six Corridors’. Each
corridor has its own theme and focus of economic
development: Sumatra Economic Corridor as a center for
production and processing of natural resources and as
nation’s energy reserves; Java Economic Corridor as a
driver for national industry and service provision;
Kalimantan Economic Corridor as a center for produc-
tion and processing of national mining and energy
reserves”; Sulawesi Economic Corridor as a center for
production and processing of national agricultural,
plantation, fishery, oil & gas, and mining; Bali – Nusa
Tenggara Economic Corridor as a gateway for tourism
and national food support; and finally Papua – Kepulauan
Maluku Economic Corridor as a center for development
of food, fisheries, energy, and national mining.
The total investment for the six corridors will amount
to Rp. 4,012 trillion and 43% of which will be chan-
nelled towards infrastructure development (CMEA, 2011).
To fund the program, the private funding is projected to
contribute to 51% of the funding, or Rp. 100 trillion per
year. In 2010, the Coordinating Ministry of Economic
Affairs targeted to raise fund IDR 980 trillion under the
PPP scheme (CMEA, 2010). This amount is equivalent to
more than 68.5% of its IDR 1,430 trillion infrastructure
investment required at the national level over the period
2010-14.
Looking at the projected time span, the target seems
ambitious and doubtful to reach. Based on the experience
with first big PPP projects in power plant, it took 39
months to complete a process from the beginning to
financial close. This duration is much longer than
projects neighboring country like Singapore (18 months),
or Canada (18 months) and the UK (30 months) (Strate-
gic Asia, 2012). Assuming, the same condition still exist,
the timetable to achieve the expected target needs to be
revised. Otherwise, improvement in PPP framework
mechanism needs to be simplified, resources who
manage the procurement process needs to be improved
and best practices need to be shared and adopted to
address problems,
II. VALUE FOR MONEY
Value for money is another reason for governments to
use PPP schemes. In an annex to the statement ‘Public
Private Partnerships: The Government Approach’, the
UK Treasury addressed the cost overruns and delays in
some traditional procurement contracts which might be
alleviated under the PPP procurement route. The follow-
ing Table shows problems that were identified in some
projects under conventional procurement.
Mott MacDonald (2002) studied the delays and cost
overruns in both traditional and PPP projects in the UK.
They examined 39 traditionally-financed projects and
reported high levels of delay (p. 14). The highest average
delays occurred in the equipment/development type of
project (54%), followed by non-standard buildings (39%),
standard civil engineering (34%), non-standard civil
engineering (15%) and standard building type of project
(4%). In addition, the traditionally-procured projects had
a high level of cost overruns. The highest occurred in the
equipment/development type of project (214%), followed
by non-standard civil engineering (66%), non-standard
buildings (51%), standard civil engineering (44%) and
standard building type of projects (24%).
Achieving value for money has also been identified by
the Canadian Governement as the primary rationale for
delivering infrastructure through PPP. The Canadian
practitioners of PPPs defined value for money as a
measure of the extent to which cost savings are achieved
when delivering a public infrastructure project through a
PPP relative to a traditional government-led procurement
approach. Siemiatycki (2013) reported that PPP in
Canada had been attractive because of delivering the
project earlier than the agreed schedule:
‘Public-private partnerships promise better value, timeliness
and accountability for public infrastructure projects. That’s
exactly what the City of Winnipeg experienced with our 3.5
kilometre Chief Peguis Trail Extension. The project, including
an underpass, multi-use pathway and pedestrian overpass,
was completed one year ahead of schedule thanks, in large
part, to this innovative approach.’
Indonesia Government has experienced a number of
delays in infrastructure projects such as Jakarta Monorail,
Sunda Strait Bridge; and unsuccessfull projects such as
Dumai Water Suply which has spent government fund
for IDR 239 billion. This problem is similar to the
problems in countries which have developed PPP earlier.
However, very few arguments provided in Indonesia PPP
investor guide which highlight value for money issue.
This may indicate that the government is so far only
concern on inviting private partners but put less atten-
tion on value for money they need to achieve from the
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PPP. In addition, the guidance provided by the govern-
ment has lack attention on the importance of output
specification, which is the heart of the PPP procurement.
2. UNOFFICIAL REASONS
Failing to be convinced by Government, a number of
reasons for using the PPP have been articulated by public
policy observers in the UK. Since these reasons were not
officially stated, they are described as unofficial reasons.
These are off-balance sheet and ideological reasons.
I.  OFF-BALANCE SHEET FINANCING
A number of studies reported that the use of the PPP
was driven by the opportunity to have the asset recorded
off-balance sheet in the Government accounts
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 2002; Heald, 1997; Heald and
Georgiou, 2011; Hodges and Mellett, 1999, 2012;
McQuaid and Scherrer 2010, p. 30; Terry, 1996). The
importance of this accounting instrument is to enable
the Government to develop public infrastructure without
increasing the level of public borrowing. This is because
the rules imposed by the European Union on member
state budget deficits and debt have potentially limited
public borrowing (McQuaid and Scherrer, 2010). Based
on its risk transfer methodology, the use of the PPP can
camouflage an investment as ‘a series of smaller annual
revenue expenditures over the life of the project’ and
consequently allow the acquisition of new infrastructure
without apparent increases in public borrowing
(McQuaid and Scherrer, 2010, p. 30).
Heald and Georgiou (2011) identified that, up to
October 2007, there were 87% of 618 PPP projects in the
UK which were off-balance sheet. The Scottish Govern-
ment and the Department for Children, Schools and
Families in England were the two top departments in the
UK with the largest number (114 and 98 respectively) and
with the highest proportion (99% and 100% respectively)
of off-balance sheet PPP projects. These figures show that
all projects in the school sector in England and almost
all projects in Scotland did pass the off-balance sheet
requirement of TTTN1 through significant risks being
transferred to the private sector. This situation, according
to Heald (2003), may imply lower VFM for the public
sector, since the accounting treatment was the  dominant
consideration in project selection rather than obtaining
VFM from public expenditure.
In Indonesia context, off-balance sheet is not a critical
issue as in the United Kingdom. Based on data release by
trading indicators, the ratio of debt to GDP for Indonesia
is only 26.11%, far below the United Kingdom of
90.60%. In addition, Indonesia has no restriction to have
greater debt as imposed on European Countries under
through 60% Maastricht debt criterion
II. IDEOLOGY
Ideology is suggested as another important unofficial
reason by academics and political commentators to
explain why the UK Government insisted on the use of
the PPP. Referring to Government policy since the end of
the 1970s, Edwards and Shaoul (2003, p. 397) asserted
that public policy in the UK has been dominated by the
neo-liberal agenda of privatising state-owned trading
enterprises such as public corporations and Government
Agencies. Similarly, the PPP has been designed to have
the delivery of public sector support services and,
increasingly, their core services provided by the private
sector based on long-term contractual arrangements.
Consequently, the Government and its agencies would
become ‘the procurer and regulator of service rather than
the provider’ (Edwards and Shaoul, 2003; Hatcher, 2006).
Thus, the PPP policy was widely perceived as another way
TABLE 4: PROBLEMS WITH CONVENTIONAL PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
Source: Treasury (2000, p. 18)
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of privatising public service delivery that could not be
fully privatised for financial or political reasons (Edwards
and Shaoul, 2003; Monbiot, 2002; Connolly et al, 2008).
This approach, according to Broadbent and Laughlin
(2002), was not a technical matter, but more an ideology:
There were strong ideological elements in the conception of
PPP. An element of this is a belief that there should be a
greater private sector involvement in the services that have
been provided, in the past, by the UK’s public and govern-
ment authorities (p. 630).
Criticism on the neoliberal agenda by the then
President Susilo Bambang Yudoyono did exist during his
administration. However, there is no specific rejection to
the inception of PPP programs initiated by the Govern-
ment as what happened in the UK. This can be under-
stood for the following reasons. First, all PPP projects
offered in Indonesia are for hard economic infrastruc-
tures and none of them in the category of social infra-
structure such as school in the UK PPP. It is clearly said
in the PPP guidance that the scope for the PPP are
airports, sea and river ports, roads and bridges, railways,
water supply and irrigation system, drinking water, waste
water, solid waste, ICT, electricity and oil and gas.
Second, high demand from the public for better infra-
structure where they will not concern whether procured
by the public or the private sector. Three, the new PPP
projects is still at early phase and no risk had been
transferred yet to the public such as extra cost they have
to pay for the services provided. In addition, no transpar-
ency from the government to the public about the cost
that the public will have to pay. In addition, the govern-
ment will be likely to provide subsidy if the cost is too
high for the public.
PPP VALUE FOR MONEY MECHANISM
The Treasury (2004a, p. 17) defined VFM as ‘the
optimum combination of whole life costs and quality’. It
clarified that VFM is not about achieving the lowest
initial price. In addition, the Treasury (2006b, p. 7)
required VFM assessment to compare the potential or
actual outcomes of the alternative procurement options.
In its early guidance, the Treasury Taskforce (1999a)
suggested the PPP procurement team make VFM judge-
ments based on the whole life costs rather than indi-
vidual cost components. The whole life costs should
include the future upgrade/maintenance requirements of
the asset and its residual value if the asset reverts to the
public sector at the end of the contract:
As PPP is about the delivery of a stream of services over the
longer term, judgements should be made on whole life costs
rather than on individual cost components incurred at
particular junctures. The evaluation of bids needs to focus
on the overall cost of services over the life of the contract
rather than on the phasing of items of expenditure or
individual cost components within it. For example, in
competing for the same service requirement, two rival bidders
may have different approaches, with one choosing to have
high upfront capital investment with lower future upgrade/
maintenance requirements, and the other relatively low initial
capital investment but with more frequent renewals and
upgrades. The procurer should concern itself with the overall
NPV of bidders’ unitary charges rather than the mix or
balance of individual components within it. If the asset
reverts to the public sector at the end of the contract, the
procurer should also assess the residual value of that asset to
get a whole life value of each bidder’s proposals (Treasury
Taskforce, 1999a, para. 4.2.1)
The Treasury Taskforce (1997, p. 8) acknowledged
that there are extra costs incurred from the use of the
PPP. These are provider’s profit, bid costs and borrowing
costs. However, it was claimed that the extra costs
incurred can be outweighed by the benefits derived from
the PPP, as shown in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3: THE VFM BALANCE
Source: Treasury Taskforce (1997, p. 8)
To measure value for money of a PPP project, most
countries used Public Sector Comparator as assessment
tool (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004).  UK Policy Statement
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Number 2 (Treasury Taskforce, 1998b, para. 1.3.2) defines
the PSC as ‘a cost estimate based on the assumption that
assets are acquired through conventional funding and
that the procurer retains significant managerial responsi-
bility and exposure to risk’. Grimsey and Lewis (2004, p.
137) considered the PSC as a benchmark cost of provid-
ing required services under conventional procurement.
The PSC is to be produced prior to the procurement of a
project, to test the potential VFM of procurement options
(Treasury, 2003a, p. 7).  The overview of the cost struc-
ture of the PSC and the PPP is shown in Figure 4. Both
the PSC and PPP include the same retained risk, which is
the risk retained by the public sector. In addition to the
retained risk, the PSC should include risk adjustment
and project base costs. On the other hand, the PPP cost
structure only includes the cost of service payments in
addition to the retained risks.
FIGURE 4: VALUE FOR MONEY COMPARISON BETWEEN A PSC AND A
PPPBID
Source: Treasury Taskforce (1999c, p. 6)
Under the PSC, all relevant and material risks should
be identified and assigned (Treasury Taskforce, 1999c, p.
40). Some risks could be clearly classified as transferable
to the supplier, such as design risks, or as retained in the
public sector, such as policy risks. However, there are
risks which are potentially either transferable or
retainable. These are classified as negotiable risks and
could be partially transferred to the private sector accord-
ing to a given formula (p. 40). The procuring authority is
suggested to include in the PSC the estimates of the basic
costs of capital assets, including any fit-out costs needed
to convert an existing property to the required use
(Treasury Taskforce, 1999c, p. 14). Besides the upfront
construction costs, the basic capital costs should also
include the full lifecycle costs of maintaining the assets
in order to deliver the output specification (examples of
these costs are the replacement of lifts, rewiring or
changes in equipments with shorter life expectancies).
The basic capital cost estimation in the PSC should
reflect all resource costs of the project, including the
opportunity cost of the asset if sold or used for another
purpose. All the assumptions should follow the latest
experience of conventional procurement, such as assump-
tions about construction techniques. Besides basic capital
costs, basic operating costs should also be included in the
Public Sector Comparitor. The operating costs include
the costs of services according to the output specification
over the period of contract (Treasury Taskforce, 1999c, p.
16).
Indonesia PPP guidance acknowledges common PPP
practices to use PSC as tool for value for money assess-
ment. However, the guidance declines to use the PSC for
reasons of being unrealistic to be applied in Indonesia
due to limited government budget and capacity.
Traditional VfM analysis determines whether a PPP ap-
proach will deliver the service or infrastructure more effec-
tively and at less cost than through standard public sector
means, as represented by the Public Sector Comparator
(PSC). However, this traditional approach is based on
assumptions that do not reflect conditions in Indonesia. For
example, a traditional VfM analysis using a PSC implicitly
assumes that public sector development of the infrastructure
is a realistic option. Due to limited government budgets and
capacity, it may not be an option in Indonesia. (CMEA,
2011)
As alternative, Indonesian PPP uses project modalities
approach with a sequence steps. First, a full range of
project modalities from fully public to fully private are
identified. Second, Parametersthat can affect project
success are identified, which include social, institutional,
technical and economic factors. Third, modalities are
evaluated qualitatively relative to one another against
these parameters to determine the most promising
modalities. Fourth, available risk mitigation mechanisms
are then considered, which may re-order or expand the
feasible modalities. Finally, the top-ranked modalities are
then evaluated quantitatively using a financial model to
determine which modality yields the highest revenue
constrained project net present value. The revenue
Public-Private Partnerships: an International Development vis a vis Indonesia Experience / RIZAL YAYA / http://dx.doi.org/10.18196/jgp.2014.0020
219
Journal of Government and Politics Vol.5 No.2 August 2014
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
constraint is applied to reflect end-user willingness to pay
or off-taker avoided cost. Problems with this methodology
is lack attention on identifying risk and transferring
them to the best party able to manage it as compared to
the PSC model. Under the PSC, from the very beginning
risk should be identified and that process is helpful in
making clear private partner responsibility. In addition, a
thorough process is essential in the implementing risk
transfer mechanism.
Under common PPP approach some factors are
identified to result in better value for money (Treasury
Taskforce, 1997, para. 3.08). These are: (1) bundling of
design, build and service operation; (2) output specifica-
tion that encourages innovative design, re-engineering,
avoidance of over-specification, new materials or more
efficient maintenance (including guaranteed mainte-
nance at the appropriate time); and (3) efficient alloca-
tion of risks to the parties best able to manage them at
least cost. Details on how the above aspects contribute to
VFM are now discussed and compared with Indonesia
experience.
1. PPP BUNDLING
Martimort and Pouyet (2008) explained some circum-
stances where PPP methodology would perform better
than conventional procurement. They proposed that, in a
situation where a performance contract can be written
and infrastructure design can save operating costs,
bundling the tasks of building and managing the assets
would be the optimal organisational structure. The
argument is that private consortia can better internalise
the impact of the improved infrastructure quality on
operating costs. Consequently, a private consortium will
strive to produce better design of the infrastructure in
order to gain a bonus by lower operating costs. These
benefits do not exist under conventional procurement, as
the building and managing asset tasks are undertaken by
separate entities. De Bettignies and Ross (2010) added
that better performance under bundling is caused by the
efforts made by the PPP builder and operator. As the
builder’s efforts can have a positive impact in reducing
operating cost, they would exert the first-best level of
effort to increase project quality. By contrast, under
unbundling, the builder would only exert ‘a strictly
positive but second-level effort’. In addition, Iossa and
Martimort (2008, p. 16) suggested that the effort level
with bundling is higher.
PPP projects in Indonesia do not necessary follow the
pure method of project bundling in overseas. This can be
seen from the establishment of PT. Indonesia Infrastruc-
ture Financing (PT. IIF) by Indonesian Government
through its state owned enterprise PT. Sarana Multi
Infrastructure (PT SMI) to provide funding towards
commercially feasible projects. To increase its capacity PT
IIF received loan from World Bank and Asian Develop-
ment Bank. This company plays it role in increasing the
availability of equity and long term debt, particularly
rupiah available for private infrastructure investment in
Indonesia. Therefore, the project company in Indonesia
may consist of project sponsors, either from the private
sector including local and foreign invetsors, and/or
government through state-owned enterprise. This mecha-
nism follow the Canadian PPP where some projects may
have upfront finance by the Government and only one
third as private finance (Siemiatycki, 2013). The advan-
tage of this approach is to reduce high cost of private
finance which is usually more expensive than public
funds.
2. PPP OUTPUT SPECIFICATION AND VALUE
FOR MONEY
The Treasury Taskforce (1999c, p. 10) defines output
specification as ‘a statement of needs to be satisfied by
the procurement of external resources’. It is an instru-
ment to specify what the public sector client wants to
procure and what the supplier is expected to provide.
This instrument is used by the public sector to construct
the PSC, and is utilised by the private sector to prepare
PPP bids.
The Treasury (2003b, p. 33) stated that the output
specification is different from the input specification
approach under conventional procurement. Under
conventional procurement, the procuring authority
describes precisely the work required to deliver particular
services. This is then tendered for to secure competitive
pricing and the most economically advantageous proposal
for the construction. However, 4Ps (2001), a consulting
body for PPP projects established by the Local Govern-
ment Association and Partnerships UK, stated that, if the
design and plan produced by the public sector was
inappropriate, it is the public sector that will bear the
cost to put the construction back on track if costs
increase because of project delays. Consequently, conven-
tional procurement has the potential to cost more than
the original estimated cost, or can fail to meet the initial
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output objectives. In addition, a number of uncertainties
in terms of building lifecycle maintenance, ongoing
provision of services, and efficiency of facilities, would
exist after asset construction (4Ps, 2001).
Under PPP procurement, the procuring authority only
specifies the services required (Treasury, 2003a). The
selection of a preferred bidder is based on the competi-
tion to offer better whole life costs and the quality to
meet users’ requirement and not necessarily based on the
one with lower construction cost. According to 4Ps
(2001), this approach would encourage a focus on
strategic needs rather than on ‘the history and detail of
current provision’ (p. 5). A proper output specification
would drive the private sector to come up with new ideas
about the design, construction and operation of schools
(p. 6). As this approach also encourages bidders to
develop means to deliver the outputs within a fixed
performance-related pricing mechanism, 4Ps (2001, p. 6)
stated that the PPP should ‘lead to better designed and
operated schools in the longer term’. The Treasury
(2003a) also argued that the use of an output specifica-
tion would benefit the public sector as this can drive the
private sector to meet the desired output objectives by
using their best expertise and know how to deliver the
service.
Although output specification is at the heart of the
use of the PPP, guideline on PPP performance standards
in Indonesia is very limited. In the investor guideline
issued by the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs,
performance standards is one of the elements to be
included in the document of Cooperation Agreement.
However, there is no further details about how the
performance standards will be used and what mechanism
will be applied to record the performance. Transparency
and the existing of clear guidance in this area is very
much needed as much of the government needs private
involvement. Value for money study in the country with
mature PPP phase shows the important of clarity in
output specification. Yaya’s (2013) study shows that
projects with poor output specification is less value for
money than those with thorough output specification.
3. PPP RISK TRANSFER AND VALUE FOR
MONEY
Risk transfer is defined by the Treasury Taskforce
(1999c, p. 63) as ‘the process of moving the responsibility
for the financial consequences of a risk from the public
to the private sector’. This concept is based on the public
sector’s efforts to find a solution for cost overruns in
public infrastructure procurement. The TTTN Number 5
(Treasury Taskforce, 1999c, p. 8) stated that an optimum
risk transfer can lead to ‘dramatic improvements in value
for money’. However, OECD (2008, p. 49) suggested that
risk allocation to the party best able to manage it does
not mean maximum risk transfer. Figure 5 shows that
risk transfer could improve VFM to a certain level after
which VFM declines as the result of more risk transfer.
FIGURE 5: RISK TRANSFER AND OPTIMAL VFM
Source: Treasury Taskforce (1997, p. 11)
Theoretically, VFM is improved by transferring risk to
the private sector which can reduce it in terms of the
probability of occurrence or financial consequences, if
the risks do materialise. However, VFM will decline if the
public sector keeps transferring risks which cannot be
best managed by the private sector. The decline is caused
by the benefits of risk transfer being outweighed by the
premium charged by the private sector. Furthermore,
having too much risk transfer may result in the public
sector paying a premium for something that will not be
delivered. This is because there are many PPP projects
with services which cannot be neglected, such as health
and education. Consequently, when problems arise, the
public sector would have to step in, thus providing an
implicit guarantee to the private sector. It is the optimum
rather than the maximum total risk transfer which
should be aimed at by the PPP procurement method.
Under Indonesian PPP framework, risk transfer issues
seem not properly addressed. This can be inferred from
no clear guidance about what penalty will be imposed for
not meeting the standards and and how it will be
executed.
CONCLUSION
The development of PPP around the world has
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attracted Indonesia Government to use this approach
intensively for its new infrastructure projects. Ambitious
target has been set up by the Government to raise IDR
980 trillion under PPP to fund its IDR 1,430 trillion new
infrastructure projects over the period 2010-2014. Reasons
for using the PPP follow the argument of other countries
of the need for greater investment and better value for
money. However, the PPP framework in Indonesia does
not address properly the issue of output specification and
risk transfer which is the key point to achieve better
value for money.
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